Prospective Limitation of Constitutional Decisions in Criminal Cases by Dobbyn, John F.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 36 
Issue 3 Summer 1971 Article 1 
Summer 1971 
Prospective Limitation of Constitutional Decisions in Criminal 
Cases 
John F. Dobbyn 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John F. Dobbyn, Prospective Limitation of Constitutional Decisions in Criminal Cases, 36 MO. L. REV. 
(1971) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol36/iss3/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
PROSPECTIVE LIMITATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES
JoHN F. DOBBYN*
In 1965, the Supreme Court was impelled by circumstances of its own
making to launch itself on the uncharted course of prospective limitation
of its decisions in the field of constitutional rights of the criminal defendant.
The evolution of that principle, through the cases that followed its incep-
tion in Linkletter v. Walker," provides an interesting chapter in the evolu-
tion of the Court itself, with serious implications concerning the Court's
relative position in a constitutionally constructed system of government.
While Linkletter gave birth to the device of prospective application of
constitutional decisions, it was inevitably conceived some four years earlier
in the decision of Mapp v. Ohio.2 An analysis of prospective limitation
based only on the criteria discussed in Linkletter would be superficial. To
understand its actual causes and effects it is necessary to trace a line of
cases beginning fifty-one years earlier.
In 1914, the Court ruled in Weeks v. United States3 that evidence
seized by federal officers in violation of the fourth amendment guaranty
of the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures" would not be admissible
in a federal criminal trial against a defendant whose right had been violated.
The Court reversed the conviction of Weeks because it had been based on
evidence unlawfully seized from his home without a search warrant. Be-
cause of the accepted doctrine of the supervisory power of the Supreme
Court over the lower federal courts in matters of evidence and procedure,
there was no question of the power of the Court to fashion such a rule
of exclusion. The effect of the rule in opening up prior federal convictions
to collateral attack was not considered.
In 1949, the Court in Wolf v. Colorado4 declared for ,the first time
that the fourth amendment right to freedom from arbitrary intrusion by
governmental agents was "basic to a free society" and "implicit in the 'con-
cept of ordered liberty,' and as such enforceable against the States through
the Due Process Clause" of the fourteenth amendment.5 The Court in
Wolf would not, however, take the critical step of applying the exclusionary
rule of Weeks to the state courts, holding that the remedies to be afforded
t
'Associate Professor of Law, Villanova Law School; A.B. Harvard 1959; LL.B.
Boston College Law School 1965; LL.M. Harvard Law School 1969.
1. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
2. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
4. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
5. Id. at 27-28.
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by the state against violations of the fourth amendment are "not to be so
dogmatically answered as to preclude the varying solutions which spring
from an allowable range of judgment on issues not susceptible of quantita-
tive solution."6
There the matter stood for twelve years. The federal exclusionary rule
was expanded to include evidence unreasonably seized by state officers,7
and federal officers were enjoined from bringing such evidence into a state
court.8 The number of states adopting the exclusionary rule rose from
eighteen to twenty-six. 9 None of these developments, however, concerned
the basic question of whether it was proper for the Supreme Court to im-
pose the exclusionary rule on the states.' 0
In 1961, the Court took the step that plunged it toward such unfore-
seen consequences as the rule of prospective limitation. In Mapp v. Ohio"
the Court ruled that evidence seized by state officers in violation of the de-
fendant's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures must be
excluded in a criminal trial in a state court, and reversed the conviction of
Miss Mapp. Despite Justice Clark's attempt to categorize this as the mere
logical progression of the line of thought on search and seizure begun in
Weeks, the Court had indiscriminately crossed two fundamental boundaries.
It had moved from the safe realm of its broad power over federal courts
into the precarious terrain of its constitutionally limited power over state
courts, and had simultaneously brushed aside the delicate barriers between
proper judicial and legislative action. The necessity for dear and precise
thinking on each of these considerations could not be replaced, without
serious side-effects, with eloquent dissertations on the majesty of constitu-
tional rights.
The first consideration was the limited authority of the Supreme Court
in matters relating to state law and procedure, which had been dearly de-
lineated since the decision of Martin v. Hunters Lessee'2 in 1816. When de-
ciding a case before it the Court must apply the Constitution as the supreme
law of the land, and where it conflicts with state law or procedure the
Constitution prevails as the law of the case. The Court, therefore, could
properly impose the exclusionary rule on the states only if the Constitution
required it.
In Wolf, Justice Frankfurter had found that the exclusionary rule was
6. Id. at 28.
7. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), overruling the doctrine of
Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
8. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956). Note that the Court was ex-
pressly exercising its supervisory power over federal officials. Id. at 216-17.
9. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1960).
10. With the ultimate determination in Wolf-that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not itself require state courts
to adopt the exclusionary rule with respect to evidence illegally seized by
state agents-we are not here directly concerned. Id. at 213.
11. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
12. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
[Vol. 86
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"not derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth Amendment,"
and therefore the basic right of privacy did not demand the exclusion of
logically relevant evidence.13 While the power of the Court in its super-
visory capacity to impose the exclusionary rule on the lower federal courts
was unquestioned, the Court had no power to impose its will on the states
in the form of an exclusionary rule where no conflict arose between the
Constitution and state procedure. Again, in 1954, Justice Jackson, writing
for the Court in Irvine v. California,'4 characterized the exclusionary rule
as one of the "subsidiary procedural and evidentiary doctrines developed
by the federal courts,"15 and not constitutionally required. He drew a pre-
cise distinction in that the "petitioner is not invoking the Constitution to
prevent or punish a violation of his federal right recognized in Wolf or to
recover reparations for the violation. He is invoking it only to set aside his
own conviction of crime." 16 As late as 1960, in Elkins v. United States,'7
the Court had spoken of the exclusionary rule as merely a "rule of evidence"
imposed on lower federal courts. Justice Frankfurter, in his dissenting
opinion in Elkins (in which Justice Clark, author of the majority opinion
in Mapp, joined), spoke of the change in this "rule of evidence" as "not
constitutionally compelled."' 8
Justice Clark found support for his majority opinion in Mapp in phrases
gleaned from opinions dealing with the exclusionary rule in federal courts;
however, in these cases the issue of whether the rule was constitutionally
required or merely judicially devised played no part, and was therefore not
critically analyzed.19 He built the cornerstone of the Mapp opinion on the
decision originating the exclusionary rule by flatly stating that "the Court
in that case [Weeks] clearly stated that use of the seized evidence involved
'a denial of the constitutional rights of the accused.' " 20 A closer look at the
Weeks quotation in context reveals that the Court in Weeks was indicating
that the seizure and retention of certain letters was violative of constitu-
tional rights, not their use in evidence.2 '
Justice Clark also drew an inappropriate comparison between the
exclusion of evidence unreasonably seized and the exclusion of coerced
confessions. He overlooked the distinction that the flat command of the
fifth amendment that "no person... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself" is specifically violated at the time of
13. Wolf v. Colorado, 588 U.S. 25, 28 (1949).
14. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
15. Id. at 132.
16. Id. at 136.
17. 864 U.S. 206 (1960).
18. Id. at 234 (dissenting opinion in which Justices Harlan and Whittaker also
joined).
19. See, e.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920);
Weeks v. United States, 282 U.S. 883 (1914).
20. Mapp v. Ohio, 867 U.S. 648, 648 (1961), quoting from Weeks v. United
States, 282 U.S. 388, 898 (1914).
21. Weeks v. United States, 282 U.S. 883, 898 (1914).
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introducing a coerced confession into evidence at trial, while the fourth
amendment guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures is violated
at the time of the search and seizure. The later exclusion of such evidence at
the time of trial is not expressly commanded by the fourth amendment.
The fifth member of the bare majority in Mapp, Justice Black, adhered
to his earlier view:
I am still not persuaded that the Fourth Amendment, stand-
ing alone, would be enough to bar the introduction into evidence
against an accused of papers and effects seized from him in viola-
tion of its commands. For the Fourth Amendment does not itself
contain any provision expressly precluding the use of such evi-
dence, and I am extremely doubtful that such a provision could,
properly be inferred from nothing more than the basic command
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 22
The conclusion of this analysis is that the Court overreached its legit-
imate power over the states when it imposed on them a rule that had no
substantial claim to the stature of a constitutional dictate.2 3
In the second, more subtle consideration, the Court blithely glided
over the boundary of proper judicial activity, with little or no trepidation,
and moved unequipped into the field of legislation.
The scheme of the Constitution was to create a unified governing ma-
chine by assembling a limited number of parts, each carefully designed to
perform its particular function, and to fit smoothly and work in harmony
with the others.24 The powers entrusted to a legislature, as well as its
methods, differ greatly from those of the Court; and the tools of each
are shaped to the function to be performed. Not only is the balance of
the machine thrown off when one part encroaches on the territory of the
other, but, in addition, neither is adequately equipped to operate outside
of its own sphere.25
22. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661-62 (1961). Justice Black alone among
the majority reached his concurrence in result by reading the constitutional re-
quirement of exclusion into the interplay between the fourth and fifth amend-
ments. The inapplicability of the fifth amendment guarantee against compulsory
self-incrimination is suggested by the fact that a valid search warrant would justify
seizure and use as evidence of the matter taken from Miss Mapp, while no procedure
could validate the extraction and use of a coerced confession.
23. Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision:
Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. Rxv. 650, 663 (1962).
24. Justice Jackson stated in National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer
Co., 337 U.S. 582, 590-91 (1949), "The doctrine of separation of powers is funda-
mental in our system. It arises, however, not from Art. III nor any other single
provision of the Constitution, but because 'behind the words of the constitutional
provisions are postulates which limit and control.'" (quoting Hughes, C.J., in
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 323 (1934)).
25. This point has special force in the area of constitutional decisions because
the Court there encroaches not just on legislative territory, but on the fall combina-
tion of powers necessary to amend the Constitution, including Congress, state
legislatures or conventions, or a national convention. See Currier, Time and
Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. RF-v. 201 (1965).
[V/ol. 86
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [1971], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol36/iss3/1
PROSPEC TIVE LIMITATION
To be more specific, the assigned role of the Court differs sharply
from that of a legislature, both in area of responsibility and in method. The
Court is primarily responsible for developing principles of law by decid-
ing cases between contesting litigants based on concrete fact situations,
while a legislature deals with the broader problems affecting, or potentially
affecting, society at large. Furthermore, a court characteristically deals with
unicentric problems-problems that involve a choice between two polarized
solutions (e.g., guilt or innocence, liability or non-liability, constitutional
validity or invalidity)-while a legislature is designed to complement the
court system by meeting the polycentric problems of society-problems with
more than one acceptable solution. This calls for political judgments of
policy in weighing the relative merits and demerits of various solutions. It
is no accident that political decisions of the latter kind are entrusted to a
body composed of representatives periodically answerable to constituents,
while the task of reasoning to the legally correct decision of a dispute be-
tween litigants is entrusted to judges, who are usually free from popular
accountability and appointed, effectively, for life. When judges begin to
assume the power of a legislature over political decisions, they exceed the
trust and confidence of the governed, on which depend respect for their
decisions and obedience to their rulings.
The methods of the tnvo bodies have been fashioned to their roles and
differ sharply. A court works with the facts of the case before it, as de-
termined by evidentiary procedures that are severely limited by rules of
relevance and materiality. A legislature is equipped with fact-finding pro.
cedures that allow it to range over areas as broad as the problems to which
it addresses itself. The tools of the Supreme Court are primarily two-the
dictates to be found in the words and spirit of the Constitution and enact-
ments of Congress, and the body of broad principles that has evolved out
of years of decisional law. The limitations imposed by these "tools" breed
a confidence that judicial decisions are shaped by principles of law rather
than by the political inclinations of men.26 A legislature, on the other
hand, is expected to bring its own imagination and political proclivities,
as well as the advice of experts, to bear on a problem in devising new and
imaginative solutions, unrestricted by the principle or spirit of stare decisis.
This important distinction is reflected in the fact that legislative rules
generally apply only to private transactions taking place after they are en-
acted. They are given purely prospective effect to prevent disruption of
past transactions, and to free legislators to apply their imagination and
creativity to problems. The stability and predictability of proper judicial
decisions, on the other hand, call generally for full retroactive effect, with
little fear of unjustified disruption.
Against this background, both the problem to which the Court
26. See Mishkin, The Supreme Court 1964 Term-Foreword: The High Court,
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addressed itself in Mapp and the exclusionary rule solution were legisla-
tive in character and should have been left to the body equipped to deal
with it.27 In Elkins, the Court stated, "the [exclusionary] rule is calculated
to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter .... 2 8 The problem, in
other words, was how to combat the broad social evil of governmental in-
vasions of privacy-not the narrow problem of redeeming rights personal
to the defendant by reversing an inherently unconstitutional conviction of
Miss Mapp.2 9 The proper solution called first for the collection of data
well beyond the resources of a court-i.e., the number and seriousness of
official breaches of privacy. While the Court might roughly evaluate those
intrusions that result ultimately in convictions, it could not even estimate
those that produce evidence used in trials that result in "not guilty" ver-
dicts, or evidence used to obtain pleas of guilty, or evidence not directly
used at trial. Still further from the Court's sphere of investigation is the
number of unreasonable searches that turn up no evidence at all.
Secondly, before indiscriminately firing such a broad barrage across
the nation, the law-maker should have the best available basis for believing
that the weapon is effective against the quarry. One year before Mapp, the
Court admitted that
Empirical statistics are not available to show that the inhabitants
of states which follow the exclusionary rule suffer less from lawless
searches and seizures than do those of states which admit evidence
unlawfully obtained.3 0
After the rule had been in operation in federal courts for forty years, Justice
Jackson expressed the most accurate factual evaluation available to the
Court:
Our cases evidence the fact that the federal rule of exclusion and
our reversal of conviction for its violation are not sanctions which
put an end to illegal search and seizure by federal officers. The rule
was announced in 1914 in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383.
The extent to which the practice was curtailed, if at all, is doubt-
ful.3 '
27. This criticism goes not to the value of the exclusionary rule itself, but
to its source. If Congress had enacted the rule under its article I power in aid of
enforcing fourth and fourteenth amendment rights, or its power under section 5
of the fourteenth amendment, the problem of overstepping the federal-state
boundaries would not have arisen. The problem of legislative action by the Court
would, of course, also have been eliminated.
28. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). This was no passing,
unconscious phrase in Elkins, loosely improvised and forgotten. The legislative
character of the Mapp exclusionary rule lay at the heart of the Court's later opinion
in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), to be discussed later.
29. See Bender, supra note 23, at 663-64. Compare areas in which the focus
is on the personal right of the defendant deprived of due process in the trial
itself-such as the areas of coerced confessions or denial of trial counsel There,
deterrent effect on law enforcement authorities is secondary to redeeming the con-
stitutional rights of the defendant before the Court.
30. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960).
31. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 135 (1954).
[Vol. 36
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Finally, a legislature would be the proper body to make the policy
choice among the many solutions available, which include a wide variety
of possible criminal and civil sanctions against offending officials capable
of being administered by courts, boards, or administrative agencies. The
Constitution expressed no preference for the exclusionary rule over other
possible solutions.3 2
At this point, then, the Court had seemingly exceeded the constitu-
tional limits of its power in imposing on state courts an arbitrary rule,
neither expressed nor implicit in the Constitution, and had ceased to func-
tion in the role of a court when it made a legislative choice for such a rule.
While the nature of a Supreme Court ruling is such that it becomes ef-
fectively the law of the land in state and federal courts regardless of im-
proprieties in its promulgation,3 3 the Court could not avoid the inevitable
ill-effects on the system. Understandably, Mapp took the state courts by
surprise. They had justifiably imagined themselves free to establish their
own rules of evidence as long as they violated no dictate of the Constitution.
To apply the legislative rule of Mapp in the usual retroactive manner of
a judicial decision would have produced intolerable disruption. It "would
tax the administration of justice to the utmost."3 4 Criminal convictions in
every state would be affected-some more seriously than others. In 1960,
twenty-four states still freely admitted unreasonably seized evidence.8 5
Even among the twenty-six states that had adopted an exclusionary rule,
an issue could be made of variations between requirements of the previous
state standard of unreasonableness of the search and seizure and the new
federal standard.3 6 In an amicus brief in Linkletter, the National Dis-
trict Attorneys' Association estimated that one-third to one-half of the
prisoners in custody at the time of Mapp (1961) were still in custody at the
time of Linkletter (1965). In 1962 Judge Sobel, then a New York trial judge,
estimated that a search and seizure issue might have been raised in about
ten percent of his criminal cases.87 This percentage has risen with the in-
crease in prosecutions of contraband cases such as those dealing with nar-
cotics offenses. The amicus brief estimated that the number of closed state
cases subject to reopening could run well into the thousands. In many of
such supposedly "closed" cases the problems of lost or destroyed evidence
and unavailable witnesses could be predicted to be serious.
32. Notice that this choice of methods brings the problem within the defini-
tion of a polycentric problem as discussed above. The Court was further handi.
capped in legislating a solution to the problem because, unlike a legislature, it
was severely limited in the methods it could implement to prevent unreasonable
searches and seizures.
33. Justice Harlan felt that, in Mapp, "our voice becomes only a voice of
power, not of reason." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 686 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
34. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965).
35. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1960).
36. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
37. Sobel, The Law of Search and Seizure, Tm PL.EADE (1961) (a publica-
tion of the Kings County Criminal Bar Ass'n.).
1971]
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The Court faced the problem in Linkletter v. Walker and was com-
pelled to follow the course it had set for itself to its logical conclusion. It
had to make its ruling completely legislative in character by declaring it
applicable only to cases that had not become final at the time of the Mapp
decision-June 19, 1961. The rule of prospectivity was illegitimately born
as a result of the Court's breach of its limits as a court and its incursion
into the province of state authority.
The three considerations listed by the Court in deciding on prospec-
tivity bear on this thesis-the purpose of the new rule, the reliance on
previous law, and the effect on the administration of justice. The purpose
was not to redeem any constitutional right of Miss Mapp violated at the
trial, but rather to deter lawless police action generally.38 Reliance by the
states on their freedom under the tenth amendment to accept or reject
an exclusionary rule in the absence of a constitutional dictate (as con-
firmed in Wolf) was justifiable, and would have led to a seriously disrup-
tive effect on the administration of justice if this abrupt shift in the law
were given retroactive effect.
If looked at closely, in other words, the three-prong test will classify
a rule of law as within or without the proper sphere of activity for the
Supreme Court. A broad social purpose that looks well beyond the rights
of the particular defendant and those like him, and involves a choice of
solutions, flags a legislative decision. Where state court reliance on prior
law is truly justified, with due regard for properly evolving interpretations
of constitutional requirements, there is an indication that the Supreme
Court is operating beyond its limited power over the states. If the disruptive
effect of a new rule is great, there is a red flag that indicates the tests of
purpose and reliance should be rigorously applied to detect improper
judicial activism. When, as in Mapp, the three tests indicate an overstepping
by the Court in either of the two senses discussed above, the device of
prospective limitation will be required to alleviate the imbalance in the
system.
This thesis can be tested from two directions. Considering first cases
that have been given retroactive effect, Gideon v. Wainwright 9 provides
an apt comparison with the earlier Mapp decision. In Gideon the Court
dealt with the specific, express guaranty of the sixth amendment that "in
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have the
assistance of Counsel for his defense," and found as a starting point that the
right to counsel was a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial, and as
such, applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. This
parallels the Wolf finding that the search and seizure guaranty applies to
the states. The Court fulfilled its proper role by comparing the Florida
criminal process (which denied counsel to Gideon in his felony trial) with
38. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965).
39. 872 US. 835 (1963).
[VOL 36
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the direct constitutional mandate; the conflict was resolved by simply ap-
plying the Constitution as the supreme law and reversing Gideon's con-
viction. The direct purpose of the decision was to grant the only possible
relief to this petitioner from a denial of due process, not to use the case
primarily as a dub to deter the actions of others not before the court.
The rule of decision was not an arbitrary choice among several possible
solutions. Given the supremacy of the express constitutional dictate, the
Court had but one choice. The decision, therefore, was a proper judicial act.
State court reliance on prior law, as stated in the 1942 decision of
Betts v. Brady,40 was unjustified in view of its history. In Betts, the Court
held that "special circumstances" must be shown in each case to elevate the
denial of court-appointed counsel to a violation of due process. However,
since the case of Quicksall v. Michigan4l in 1950, the Court had never failed
to find "special circumstances." Justice Harlan commented in Gideon that
"In truth the Betts v. Brady rule is no longer a reality."42 Gideon had dearly
been foreshadowed by the evolution of the principle favoring appointment
of counsel for indigents. This, together with the fact that the Court was
applying a "flat requirement" of the Constitution 43 and not a derived rule
of implementation, indicates that the Court was exercising a legitimate
power over state procedure. In contrast to Mapp, Gideon was applied as
any other proper judicial dedsion-retroactively. 44
The effect of the Gideon decision on the administration of justice was
great. The records of the Division of Correction of the State of Florida in-
dicate that on June 30, 1962 approximately 65 percent of the 8000 state
prisoners-5200 prisoners-were not represented by counsel at the time of
their convictions. 45 In 1962, thirteen states still did not require appoint-
ment of counsel without the presence of special circumstances. 46 The
enormity of the projected effects on the administration of justice neither
prevented the Court's ruling in Gideon nor required it to bow to exigencies
40. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
41. 339 U.S. 660 (1950).
42. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 351 (1963).
43. See Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel
and Due Process Values, 61 MicH. L. REy. 219 (1962). While the particular inci-
dents of the rule are not specifically stated in the Constitution-e.g., to what cases
the right extends and at what stage of a prosecution it attaches-the rule itself is
flatly stated, and the incidents can be derived from the spirit of the rule without
the need for the judicial inventiveness that gave rise to the Weeks-Mapp exclusion-
ary rule.
44. Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 (1968). The Court did not act
blindly. The issue of prospectivity was raised by Justice Harlan in dissent. Id. at
3,4.
45. Brief for Respondent at 55-56, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
46. Kamisar, supra note 43, at 274-75. The appointment of counsel on re-
quest by many of the states, in cases not required by their rules of law, increased
as the time of Gideon drew near. The effect of this is impossible to measure mathe-
matically. It appears, however, that such voluntary appointment did not approach
the federal standard laid down in Gideon, particularly in Alabama, Florida, Mis-
sissippi, North Carolina and South Carolina.
1971]
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by making the rule prospective. The strength of the Court in both regards
lay in the fact that it was operating safely within its constitutional power
over the states and within its function as a court.47
Griffin v. Illinois48 is equally in point. There the Court compared the
Illinois practice of effectively denying appellate review of alleged trial
errors to defendants who could not afford the cost of a transcript of trial4 9
with the constitutional mandates of equal protection and due process.5 0
The principle that "all persons ... should have like access to the courts of
the country" had been unquestioned at least since the decision of Barbier
v. Connolly51 in 1885. The dictate was as dear as the flat injunction of the
fourteenth amendment that no state shall "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." In holding that the conflict
between Illinois procedure and the fourteenth amendment must be resolved
in favor of the latter, the Court exercised a valid power over the state. The
Court held carefully to the line of proper judicial conduct in vacating and
remanding, and no more. The evil was discrimination. The possibilities for
revision of procedure to cure the evil were many, and the court was careful
not to make a legislative choice of the one it preferred. That choice was
wisely left to the state.52
The effect of the decision was recognized as impressive. Justice Harlan
noted that the pronouncement would "touch the laws of at least 19 States
and will create a host of problems affecting the states of an unknown multi-
tude of indigent convicts."53 Griffin was even cited in Mapp as affecting a
47. Consistently, the rights to counsel at arraignments (White v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961)), on appeal (Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)), and at revocation of probation hearings (Mempa
v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967)) have all been applied retroactively. Arsenault v.
Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968); McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968).
48. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
49. The Court assumed for purposes of the decision
that errors were committed in the trial which would merit reversal, but
that the petitioners could not get appellate review of those errors solely
because they were too poor to buy a stenographic transcript. Id. at 16.
50. In view of the Court's assumption that Illinois could constitutionally
eliminate all appellate review of criminal convictions, although it could not con-
stitutionally grant it discriminatorily, the due process argument is inapposite-
only the equal protection issue seems in point.
51. 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
52. We do not hold, however, that Illinois must purchase a stenographer's
transcript in every case where a defendant cannot buy it. The Supreme
Court may find other means of affording adequate and effective ap-
pellate review to indigent defendants. . . . The Illinois Supreme Court
appears to have broad power to promulgate rules of procedure and appel-
late practice. We are confident that the State will provide corrective rules
to meet the problem which this case lays bare. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.12, 20 (1956).
53. Id. at 3. There could be no justifiable claim of disappointed expectations
on the part of the state in view of (1) the overwhelming continuous adherence to
the principle of equality of procedural treatment between rich and poor, and (2)
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broader class of state convictions than Mapp.54 Nevertheless, the sound con-
stitutional underpinnings of Griffin enabled the Court to apply it retro-
actively in Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms & Paroles.5r
Similarly, in Jackson v. Denno,5 6 (which arose well after Mapp) the
New York practice of submitting the issue of voluntariness of a confession
to the jury with only a preliminary determination by the court that the
confession could have been voluntary was found to violate the long-accepted
principle that a conviction based on a coerced confession, regardless of
its truthfulness, violates the clear dictate of the fifth amendment that no
person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself."57 Under the New York practice it was impossible to say that the
reliable finding of voluntariness to which the defendant was entitled was
ever made by the jury, since the only verdict rendered was a simple "guilty"
or "not guilty." Even if the jury had decided that the confession was in-
voluntary, the practical impossibility that each of the twelve laymen could
totally disregard a substantiated, truthful confession, merely because it
had been coerced, in resolving doubts of guilt or innocence,5 8 rendered the
procedure in direct conflict with the flat mandate of the fifth amendment.
The Court properly granted the petitioner no more than the Constitution
required or allowed-a determination of the voluntariness of his confes-
sion. In spite of prior rulings to the contrary59 and the severe impact of the
Jackson decision,60 the Court had no difficulty in applying Jackson retro-
actively. 61
54. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 n.9 (1961).
55. 357 U.S. 214 (1958). Prospectivity was urged in Griffin by Justice Frank-
furter. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 25-26 (1956) (concurring opinion).
The Griffin rule was extended to a similar disqualification from bringing a
second habeas corpus petition in a state court without establishing preliminary
facts that could only be found in a transcript of the first petition. The disqualifica-
tion would only affect those unable to buy such a transcript. Gardner v. Cali-
fornia, 393 U.S. 367 (1969). On application of the present thesis, this case falls
within the line of proper judicial decisions that will call for retroactive application.
The same holds true for Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961), holding invalid
an Iowa statute denying the right to file a petition for habeas corpus or an appeal
in such a case without first paying a filing fee.
56. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
57. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
58. "The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by in-
structions to the jury... all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction."
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (concurring opinion).
59. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953). See also Spano v. New York, 360
U.S. 315, 324 (1959), and Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 n.15 (1958).
60. A survey of cases indicates that fifteen states and six federal circuits as
well as Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia followed the New York rule of
allowing juries to settle issues of fact concerning voluntariness without other ju-
dicial determination. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 410 (1964) (Appendix
A to opinion of Black, J.)
61. "It is true that heretofore, without discussion, we have applied new con-
stitutional rules to cases finalized before the promulgation of the rule." Linkletter
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The thesis that the choice of prospective or retroactive application
turns on the validity of the Court's ruling in the two senses discussed
above0 2 has held consistently workable, therefore, on one side of the coin-
the retroactivity side.63 The complementary test of the thesis involves cases
on the prospectivity side.
In 1964 the Court again resorted to the exclusionary rule technique in
Escobedo v. Illinois.64 There a twenty-two year old Mexican-American was
arrested and questioned regarding the murder of his brother-in-law. His
requests to speak with his lawyer, who was making similar requests in the
next room, were denied. His confession was obtained without benefit of
counsel or advice as to his right to remain silent. The confession was intro-
duced in evidence and he was convicted of murder. The issue treated by
the Court was the admissibility of the confession under the circumstances,
and the Court held
that where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general in-
quiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police
carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting
incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been
denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police
have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right
to remain silent, the accused has been denied 'the Assistance of
62. (1) Did the Court act as a court or as a legislature?
(2) Did the Court exceed its constitutional power over the states?
63. Other significant decisions after Mapp, that are consistent with this
thesis, include:
Pointer v. Texas, 880 U.S. 400 (1965), held retroactive in Brookhart v. Janis,
384 U.S. 1 (1966). The sixth amendment right of a defendant "to be confronted
with the witnesses against him," including the implicit right to cross-examine, is
fundamental and obligatory on the states. Pointer overruled the contrary holding of
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953), which was based on the defunct theory
that no part of the sixth amendment applied to the states. No legislative em-
broidery was needed in Pointer to apply the flat sixth amendment mandate to con-
demn the Texas procedure of introducing a transcript of a living witness' prior
statements against the defendant.
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 128 (1968), held retroactive in Roberts v.
Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968). Introduction of a co-defendant's confession implicat-
ing the defendant-petitioner violated his sixth amendment right to confront wit-
nesses. The contrary holding of Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957),
had been submerged by the tide of Pointer and Jackson; therefore, when it was
properly overruled by Bruton, there could be no claim of justified reliance on
Delli Paoli. (The Court in Bruton made it clear that its ruling applied to federal
and state courts alike.)
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 891 U.S. 510 (1968), held retroactive in Bumper v.
North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543(1968), and Lopinson v. Pennsylvania, 392 U.S. 647
(1968). See also Boulden v. Iolman, 394 U.S. 478 (1969). In Witherspoon, the
Illinois procedure of allowing the prosecution to exclude any potential jurors op-
posed to capital punishment from the jury deciding on the punishment to be as-
sessed in capital cases was held to violate the clear sixth amendment right to trial
"by an impartial jury."
64. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
[Vol. 86
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Counser . . . and.., no statement elicited by the police during
the interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial.65
The Court purported to deal solely with the sixth amendment right
to counsel (citing Gideon), but the reasoning and language of the opinion
make it clear that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
was at the bottom of the decision.66 The need for counsel at this pre-trial
stage, as the Court saw it, was to advise the accused of the right to remain
silent.67
Here the Court has gone considerably beyond the fiat dictates of either
the fifth or sixth amendment. In Haynes v. Washington6s the Court had
honed to a fine edge the criteria reasonably related to detecting coercion
that would violate the fifth amendment, including the factor of notifica-
tion by the authorities of the right to remain silent and to consult an
attorney. Through the Haynes "totality of circumstances" test the Court
could hold the facts of a given case up to the constitutional dictate and
properly exercise its reversal power over a state court conviction. In Esco-
bedo, the Court short-circuited the Haynes test for applying the fifth amend-
ment to the facts and instead implemented a per se exclusionary rule
without regard to actual voluntariness of the confession, assumedly to
provide an extra measure of protection for the right. While it could safely
enforce such a rule against the federal courts, it exceeded its valid power
over the states.
The Court has, in effect, spun the sixth amendment right to "Assistance
of Counsel" in criminal prosecutions into a rule excluding confessions,
whether voluntary or involuntary, on little more than the "virtues and
morality of a system of criminal law enforcement which does not depend
on the 'confession.' "69 The Court ignores the fact that compulsion does
not necessarily flow from the fact that the defendant was not aware of
his absolute right to remain silent. It has created rights well beyond the
dictates of the Constitution and enforced those rights against the states.70
In the second sense, the Court moved beyond the evaluation of state
procedures against the yardstick of due process guaranties, and enacted a
65. Id. at 490-91.
66. "Any system of administration which permits the prosecution to trust
habitually to compulsory self-disclosure as a source of proof must itself suffer
morally thereby." Id. at 489, quoting from 8 J. WIGMORE, EvmENC 309 (3d ed.
1940). "The fact that many confessions are obtained during this period points up
its critical nature as a 'stage when legal aid and advice' are surely needed." 378
U.S. at 488.
67. Id.
68. 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
69. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 498 (1964) (dissenting opinion of
White, J.).
70. While the advice of counsel to remain silent may be an excellent tactical
weapon in winning a criminal case, it is not necessarily the sine qua non of volun-
tariness under the fifth amendment. It has been placed more accurately in per-
spective in Haynes v. Washington, 873 U.S. 503 (1963).
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detailed code of criminal procedure that was to culminate in the case of
Miranda v. Arizona.7 '
Excesses characterized in the opinion of the Court in Escobedo were
compounded in Miranda. There the Court more realistically purported
to be dealing with the fifth as well as the sixth amendments. The rule of
Miranda came down to this:
[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory
or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the de-
fendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By
custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law-
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way. . . . Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right
to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.72
What had been a loose, general code in Escobedo flowered into a de-
tailed specific set of rules for the governance of state police precincts as
well as state courts, and the club used by the Court to enforce its new code
was the exclusionary rule-exclusion of any statement (or tainted evidence)
taken in violation of any element of the code.
Rather than interpreting or applying the fifth amendment right not
to be compelled to incriminate one's self, or the sixth amendment right
to counsel, the five-man majority used them as a springboard to create high-
ly specific duties on the part of state law-enforcement authorities,73 and
reverses or affirms state court decisions depending on whether or not those
duties have been carried out. There is no justification in the Constitu-
tion for the exertion of such power over the states by the Supreme Court.
The legislative nature of the rules is obvious, not only from their
specificity and detail (compared to the generality of the words and prin-
ciples of the fifth and sixth amendments), but also from the nature of the
problem to which the Court addressed itself. The target was "incom-
municado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere"
and tactics discussed in the Wickersham Report of the 1930s and the Report
of the Commission on Civil Rights in 1961 and various police manuals.7 4
The rules were aimed at what the Court saw as the broad social problem
71. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
72. Id. at 444.
73. In these cases, we might not find the defendants' statements to have
been involuntary in traditional terms. Our concern for adequate safe-
guards to protect precious Fifth Amendment rights is, of course, not les-
sened in the slightest. Id. at 457.
74. Unless a proper limitation upon custodial interrogation is achieved-
such as these decisions will advance-there can be no assurance that prac-
tices of this nature will be eradicated in the foreseeable future. Id. at 447.
[Vol. 36
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of restraints needed to be placed on law-enforcement authorities-state
as well as federal. They were born out of the Court's frustration in working
within the constitutional limits on its function and power over the states.
Deciding issues on a case-by-case basis (as, e.g., the three confession cases
decided the proceding term; Townsend v. Sain,75 Lynumn v. Illinois"6
and Haynes v. Washington77) had not provided as rapid or effective a solu-
tion as the Court thought desirable.7 8
The Court highlights the legislative nature of its policy choice by indi-
cating it was one of several methods of reaching the same goal:
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for
protecting the privilege which might be devised by Congress or
the States in the exercise of their creative rule-making capacities.
Therefore we cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires
adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions
of the interrogation process as it is presently conducted.79
One week after Miranda the Court faced the issue of prospectivity,
holding that both Escobedo and Miranda would not be applied retro-
actively.8 o Here, as in Mapp, the Court had exceeded its role as a court
and its jurisdiction over state decisions. The states had justifiably relied
on prior decisions properly interpreting the Constitution (e.g., Haynes),
and the Court had to face the fact that "to upset all of the convictions still
pending on direct appeal (as well as final convictions) which were obtained
in trials preceding Escobedo and Miranda would impose an unjustifiable
burden on the administration of justice."81 The safety valve of prospectivity
was again needed to make a legislative decision fully legislative, and to
75. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
76. 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
77. 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
78. The Court states, on the fifty-third page of its opinion, after rationalizing
and detailing its rules of criminal procedure:
Because of the nature of the problem and because of its recurrent signifi-
cance in numerous cases, we have to this point discussed the relationship
of the Fifth Amendment privilege to police interrogation without specific
concentration on the facts of the cases before us. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 491 (1966).
79. Id. at 467. By contrast, no one "alternative" legislative enactment could
have cured the violations of the direct constitutional mandates properly reversed
in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
Note also the inadequacy of the Court's resources for this function of legislation.
Justice Clark, in dissent, refers to the "paucity of information and an almost total
lack of empirical knowledge on the practical operation of requirements truly com-
parable to those announced by the majority." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 501
(1966). The Court was not only limited in the solutions it could implement, but it
had no basis for safely predicting the effectivensss, or disruption on law enforce-
ment that its rule would produce. It had merely the raw power to enforce its ex-
periment on the states.
80. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
81. Id. at 733 (emphasis added).
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prevent, as far as possible, the disruptive effect of the imbalance between
the branches of government.
Equally consistent with this thesis is the case of Katz v. United States.82
There the search and seizure provision of the fourth amendment was used
as a basis for extending the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained through
electronic eavesdropping, regardless of any physical trespass.8 3 The contrary
rulings of Olmstead v. United States84 and Goldman v. United States8 5
were overruled. No lengthy argument is needed to show that the Katz
exclusionary rule suffered from the same legislative infirmities as the Mapp
exclusionary rule, and was a similarly excessive exercise of power against
the states.88 It is neither surprising nor inconsistent with this thesis that
Katz was applied prospectively.8 7
The decision of Lee v. Florida,8 8 holding that evidence obtained by
intercepting telephone communications in violation of section 605 of the
Federal Communications Act s9 must be excluded in a state criminal trial,
relied on two separate theories-statutory interpretation and deterrence of
police misconduct.
Under the first theory, the Court expanded its prior interpretation
of the federal statute 0 -that "no person... shall intercept.., and divulge"
a telephone communication-to apply to a state officer testifying in a state
criminal trial.9 1 In applying the statute to a new class, the Court accom-
plished the same effect as if Congress had enacted a complementary pro-
vision to section 605 to take in this new class. With any new legislative
rule, such a provision would have to be applied prospectively; and, equally,
the Court was bound to make its expansive re-interpretation prospective
to preserve balance in the system.92
82. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Although this case involved a federal conviction, the
implications are identical for state and federal procedures.
83. The Court did not refer in this opinion to the effect of any possible
violation of section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.c.
§ 605 (1964). See the discussion of Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968), notes 88-89
and accompanying text infra.
84. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
85. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
86. See the discussion of the Mapp exclusionary rule device, notes 11-21 and
accompanying text supra.
87. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
88. 392 U.S. 378 (1968).
89. Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964) (in part):
[Njo person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any com-
munication and divulge . . . the existence, contents, substance, purport,
effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person ....
90. The Court had previously held that § 605 did not prevent admission of
such testimony in state courts. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
91. No question of fourth or fourteenth amendment rights was raised or
considered by the Court. Nor was the power of Congress to protect the privacy
of telephone communications, by making them inadmissible in Court, disputed.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928).
92. Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968).
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Under the second theory, the Court withdrew from pure statutory in-
terpretation and re-entered the field of judicial legislation. Assuming that
section 605 does not render a conviction invalid because of the introduc-
tion of intercepted telephone communications, the judicially devised exclu-
sionary rule was applied to deter violation of the federal statute. Although
Mapp is expressly the model for the Lee rule, the Court has strayed even
further from its home territory in the latter case. In Mapp the Court could
claim that it was acting in aid of a constitutional amendment. In Lee the
Court's activism has the less persuasive justification of an act of Congress.
While the Court might argue the reluctance of Congress to enter the field
of legislating protections for fourth amendment search and seizure rights
as in some way justifying the Court in taking up the gauntlet, no such
reluctance of Congress to protect its own enactments could be claimed. The
result is that if Mapp called for prospectivity, then, a fortiori, prospec-
tivity was the necessary fate of its offspring in Lee.93
The cases discussed above provide well-defined building blocks with
which to construct the theory that prospective or retroactive application
of a decisional rule is foreordained by the location of that decisional rule
on one side or the other of the line marking the outer limits of proper
judicial activity. In each case the Court was frank to admit the purpose
and scope of the rule it was promulgating; and while it might not agree
that it was overreaching its powers or function, it faced up to the ramifica-
tions of that purpose and scope honestly when it became necessary to limit
the rule to prospective application. The case of Griffin v. California9 4
presents a more difficult situation because of a rather slippery shift of
ground by the Court between that decision and Tehan v. United States
ex rel. Shott.95
In 1964 the Court held for the first time, in Malloy v. Hogan,9 6 that
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment. This overruled the con-
trary holding of Twining v. New Jersey.97 Ten months later, in Griffin v.
California, the Court decided unequivocably that the fifth amendment
per se "forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence
or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt."9 8 Such a
comment is a "penalty" which "cuts down on the privilege by making its
assertion costly." 99 The Court recognized the obvious fact that the reli-
ability of the guilt-determining process was involved, since "[i]t is not
everyone who can safely venture on the witness stand though entirely in-
93. Id.
94. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
95. 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
96. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
97. 211 U.S. 78(1908).
98. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
99. Id. at 614.
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nocent of the charge against him."'100 Considerations such as fear of the
prejudicial effect of having a prior criminal record introduced to "im-
peach" his testimony might well keep an innocent defendant off the stand.
In such a case, a judge's or prosecutor's comment that an inference of guilt
is to be drawn from the defendant's silence is completely misleading. 1 1
The Griffin decision rested on firm constitutional principles. The
Court in Maloy had recalled that as early as 1947102 the Court expressly
assumed without deciding that such a comment would be a direct violation
of the fifth amendment in a federal prosecution. 10 With this in mind,
Malloy held that
the Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion the same
privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal
infringement-the right of a person to remain silent unless he
chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to
suffer no penalty.., for such silence. 10 4
In short, the Court reversed Griffin's conviction because the adverse
comment of the judge and prosecutor turned the defendant's silence into
self-accusation. This required no judicial legislation, nor did the Supreme
Court exceed the dictates of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. After
the reversals of state Court convictions on grounds of coerced confessions,
neither reliance by the states on the ancient doctrine of Twining that the
privilege against self-incrimination was not a fundamental element of due
process, nor reliance without precedent on the imagined validity of the
comment rule could be called justified. When it is remembered that Maloy
and the string of coercion cases through Haynes had all been applied retro-
actively, and that Griffin involved the added factor of the danger of con-
victing an innocent defendant on an erroneous inference of guilt, it seems
almost inconceivable that the Court would deny relief to those convicted
prior to Griffin.10 5
100. Id. at 613, quoting Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893).
Excessive timidity, nervousness when facing others and attempting to ex-
plain transactions of a suspicious character, and offences charged againsthim, will often confuse and embarass him to such a degree as to increase
rather than remove prejudices against him. Id.
101. In Griffin, the judge charged the jury:
As to any evidence or facts against him which the defendant can reason-
ably be expected to deny or explain because of facts within his knowl-
edge, if he does not testify or if, though he does testify, he fails to deny
or explain such evidence, the jury may take that failure into consideration
as tending to indicate the truth of such evidence and as indicating that
among the inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom those un-favorable to the defendant are the more probable. Id. at 610.
102. Adamson v. California, 532 U.S. 46 (1947).
105. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 2 n.1 (1964).
104. Id. at 8.
105. See the well-reasoned prediction of retroactivity in Mishkin, supra note
26, at 92-94, and Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply
to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 719 (1966).
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Then, in the spring of 1966, the Supreme Court produced Tehan v.
United States ex rel. Shotto6 and the danger of the seductiveness of prospec-
tive limitation became dear. In the face of upsetting the convictions of the
six states that allowed the comment rule, the Court retrenched from the
honest evaluation of the constitutionality of the rule and its effect on in-
dividual trials. It held that Griffin was to be limited to prospective applica-
tion.
In place of the sound, practical reasoning of Griffin, the Court found
it convenient to substitute nebulous dissertations on the majesty of the
self-incrimination privileges in general. The purpose of Griffin was no
longer the reversal of a conviction in which the exercise of the right of a
defendant not to incriminate himself was turned into self-incriminating
evidence. The purpose was now "to be found in the whole complex of
values that the privilege against self-incrimination itself represents," em-
broidered with quotations favoring the accusatorial system over the in-
quisitorial.10 7
In justifying prospectivity, the Court resorted to the following sleight-
of-hand: "The basic purposes that lie behind the privilege against self-
incrimination do not relate to protecting the innocent from conviction."'l s
Admittedly so, but the Court was not dealing with the general fifth amend-
ment privilege per se. That had already been applied retroactively in
Malloy. The Court was dealing with the comment rule, which the Griffin
opinion had found not only violative of the fifth amendment, but also
capable of leading juries to make erroneous inferences of guilt. The Court
draws groundless support from the Mapp comparison, concluding that in
both, violation of the rights of the individual "cannot now be remedied."' 09
The Court found it convenient to overlook the fact that: (1) an unreason-
able search and seizure is a violation separate from the trial itself so that
reversal of the conviction there will not heal the breach of privacy, while
it is the trial itself, infected by a judge's or prosecutor's comments, that
violates fifth amendment rights, and this can be cured by reversal of con-
viction; (2) that evidence unreasonably seized remains trustworthy, while
a judge's or prosecutor's comments can easily lead to erroneous inferences
of guilt; and (3) while Mapp established a judicially devised rule to deter
police lawlessness, Griffin reversed a conviction that itself violated the flat
command of the fifth amendment.
The lesson of Griffin is this: while prospective limitation can be a
useful device to mitigate the effects of an improper judicial decision (such
as Mapp or Miranda, discussed above), it can also be abused. It can be a
refuge for the Court during lapses of courage in applying proper judicial
interpretations of the Constitution to those entitled to relief. While the
106. 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
107. Id. at 414.
108. Tehan v. United States ex reL. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966).
109. Id. at 416.
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latter is a serious possibility to be kept in mind, it might best be considered
an aberration. In Griffin alone, of the nine cases that have been applied
prospectively to date,110 has the Court resorted to the device to avoid the
effect of a proper decision.
At this point, the factor of reliability-that is, whether a particular
constitutional decision affects the accurate determination of guilt or in-
nocence-deserves comment. Some commentators have focused too narrowly
on this element, claiming that it is the sole hinge on which the decision of
prospectivity or retroactivity turns."' This overstates its usefulness as an
indicator. First, it leads to inconsistent results, since neither the rule of
Mapp on unreasonably seized evidence nor that of Rogers v. Richmond"12
and Haynes on coerced confessions was based on the reliability of the con-
viction. 118 And yet Mapp was applied prospectively,"14 while Rogers and
Haynes have been applied retroactively.
Secondly, the reliability test frequently gives no black-or-white answer.
Its presence or absence as a factor in some cases can at best be measured
in terms of a hazy gray. One final case of prospectivity is in point here.
In 1967, the Court made its maiden assault on the field of pre-trial
identification techniques. In two cases decided on the same day, United
States v. Wade"z 5 and Gilbert v. California,"6 the Court promulgated a
comprehensive code of legislation to govern both federal and state identifi-
cations. The ruling, in substance, is this: A criminal suspect has a right to
the presence of counsel at any pre-trial line-up or other personal identifica-
tion procedure; if he is deprived of this right, any reference to the pre-trial
identification must be excluded at trial, and no witness will be allowed to
identify the defendant in court unless the prosecution proves by "dear and
convincing evidence" that the in-court identification is not the fruit of a
pre-trial identification made in absence of counsel."1 7
110. Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968);
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347(1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964); and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
111. See, e.g., Mishkin, supra note 26, at 97-101; Schwartz, supra note 105.
112. 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
113. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961), and Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 518 (1963).
114. Note that the Linkletter opinion seems not to rely on the reliability factor
as a reason for applying Mapp prospectively-but merely as removing an impedi-
ment to such application.
115. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
116. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
117. Justices White, Harlan and Stewart, in dissent, point out that the latter
places on the prosecution the impossible burden of proving that a witness' rec-
ognition of the defendant in court is based on seeing him at the scene of the
crime rather than at the more recent line-up. Theoretically, at least, the effect
of absence of counsel is to require exclusion of practically all evidence of identifi-
cation by witnesses present at the pre-trial identification. United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 251 (1967).
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This action was unique, even in the history of the Supreme Court, for
the telescoping effect with which the Court analyzed the entire range of
substantive evils in this unexplored field of identification and jumped
immediately to the drastic exclusionary rule. In the field of confessions, by
comparison, the Court gathered its understanding of the methods and
effects of the different forms of compulsion through years of examining
fact situations in cases before it. Through those years it attempted to meet
the problem within its proper bounds by evolving constitutional standards
for testing the presence or absence of compulsion. When the Court finally
broke the traces and legislated the Miranda code, it was at least based on
an understanding of the substantive evil involved. In Wade and Gilbert, the
Court gathered its comprehensive knowledge of the types and frequency
of suggestive identification techniques from a canvass of treatises on the
subject" s and a review of state court decisions.' 19 With that foundation,
the Court by-passed the possibility of developing, through case-by-case
analysis, criteria for determining when pre-trial procedure deprived a
defendant of due process. Rather, in one fell swoop, the Court legislated
a comprehensive solution to the problem (as it saw it) by combining a
requirement of counsel with an exclusionary rule. Regarding the right
to counsel, the Court recognized that local legislation or regulations which
would eliminate the "risks of abuse and unintentional suggestion at line-up
proceedings and the impediments to meaningful confrontation at trial"
may also remove the requirement of counsel at this pre-trial stage.12 0 In
other words, the right to counsel at this stage is not an absolute dictate
of the sixth amendment, as it is at the actual trial stage.1 2' It is, rather,
a substitute for other legislative regulations governing line-ups. The com-
plementing exclusionary rule reaches a second level of legislation, in that
its purpose is to enforce the judicially devised requirement of counsel.
In applying the present thesis to this analysis of the Court's rule, it is
no surprise that in Stovall v. Denno,1 22 decided on the same day, Wade and
Gilbert were limited to prospective application. This case is an excellent
example of the ineffectiveness of the reliability factor in predicting prospec-
tivity. The heart of Wade was the serious danger of convicting the innocent
on mistaken identifications that result from suggestive line-up techniques.
The sole purpose in having counsel at the line-up is his influence in elimi-
nating unfair suggestion from the identification process and his ability to
observe and make known at the trial any such suggestive elements. The
entire thrust is the prevention of mistaken identifications. The reliability
theory, then, would point to the necessity of applying Wade and Gilbert
to all possibly erroneous convictions, past or future.
118. See Id. at 228-39 nn.6-9, 11, 12, 14, 17, 24-26, 29 &c 30.
119. See Id. at 230-33 nn.10, 13, 15, 16 &c 18-23.
120. Id. at 239.
121. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 385 (1963). No refinement of the
process of trial could eliminate the sixth amendment right to counsel at that stage.
122. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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The Court in Stovall, unlike the Tehan Court, faced the issue honestly.
It recognized that Wade and Gilbert affected the reliability of trials, but
concluded that this factor, like all others, is a matter of degree; that it must
be weighed against the reliance by state courts on prior law and the effect
of retroactivity on the administration of justice. Since the present rule came
out of the blue in an area previously untouched by the Supreme Court,
turning what had been an issue of credibility for the jury into a rule of
exclusion, reliance by state courts on the prior state of the law had been
justified. 2 The effect of making the new rule retroactive would have been
overwhelming in each of the fifty states. On balance, therefore, the Court
was compelled to choose prospectivity.
There are several conclusions to be drawn from this analysis of pros-
pectivity. While it may be that the Court is "neither required to apply, nor
prohibited from applying, a decision retrospectively,"'1 4 but is actually left
to its own discretion, the device of prospectivity can be the subject of both
use and abuse. It has been the contention here that the device was properly,
and even necessarily used in Linkletter and Johnson to counterbalance the
earlier excesses of power that had occurred in Mapp and Miranda. It can,
however, be abused in cases such as Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott,
discussed above, where the Court withdraws from its responsibility to the
Constitution and to the parties before it.
The most serious abuse of the device can only be seen through a time-
lapse view of its use by the Court over a number of years. In any given case,
such as Linkletter, it can be useful and proper; but with repeated use, it can
act like a narcotic on the Court's sense of self-discipline, and can easily be-
come habit-forming. It gives instant relief to the more immediate distress that
excesses of the Court cause the administration of justice and federal-state
relations, and drugs the conscience of the Court to the effects of the more
long-range cancer in the system that grows each time the Court seizes unwar-
ranted power. The device of prospectivity is no longer an isolated solution
to a particular problem. It is fast becoming a standard weapon in the
arsenal of the Court; with its continued use, the Court drifts further and
further into the errors that produced Mapp and Miranda. In future cases,
the Court will have the device of prospectivity dearly in mind at the time
it is deciding whether or not to take a step beyond its power. The greatest
danger lies in the possibility that as the Court becomes more addicted to
this easy device, it will cease to hesitate at that threshold question of self-
discipline.12 5 Supreme Court legislation could easily become more rife than
123. While state courts cannot claim justifiable reliance on a prior law that is
in conflict with constitutional dictates and evolved principles, and is therefore
properly overruled by the Supreme Court, they cannot be expected to anticipate
excursions by the Court into legislative codes, improperly imposed upon them.
124. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965).
125. If self-restraint in the interest of harmony is appropriate, it should be
exercised at the point when it is meaningful ..., that is, at the point when
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it is today; while the system is capable of absorbing a certain amount of
imbalance and disruption, the effects could become serious. The Court is
not equipped to gather the data necessary to predict what side-effects its
thunderbolts will have on law enforcement. It can adopt the attitude that
the Bill of Rights guaranties are the supreme word and must be extended
to their farthest reaches, regardless of any side-effects. But can it do so safely,
and for how long? There is no possibility in the system for release of any
pressure of resentment or lack of confidence in the Court through the polls.
The governed class cannot ratify or repudiate the decisions of the Court at
election time in any but the most indirect way. The only alternative re-
leases lie in dashes between the legislative and judicial branches such as
Title II of the Crime Control Act of 1968126 or, more seriously, in disrespect
and, ultimately, disobedience of the Court's rules. These dangers should be
uppermost in the minds of the Justices when they consider smoothing the
chafing edges of a new ruling with the salve of prospectivity.
the Court decides whether or not to change the existing rule. Currier,
Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L.
REv. 201, 250 (1965).
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